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MANAGEMENT | RESEARCH ARTICLE
Is merit pay changing ethos in public
administration?
Renato Ruffini1, Giuseppe Modarelli2, Roberta Sferrazzo3 and Matteo Turri4*
Abstract: This article aims to explore the changes in the organizational culture of
public administrations following the implementation of performance-related pay—
PRP systems. The work explores the switch to an explicit remuneration system
through the implementation of incentives and focuses on the effects, positive or
negative, this has had on the ethos of public administrations. Data from a survey
carried out among private and public employees in a specific area of Southern Italy
are used to analyze how the shift from an implicit to an explicit remuneration
system has impacted the public servants’ ethos. Due to the application of PRP,
public servants are now expected to be compensated based on their performance.
The ineffective management of incentives in public administrations affects the
intrinsic motivation of public employees and may lead to moral disengagement.
While the previous literature has focused on the practical challenges and limitations
of PRP, less has been written about how PRP has changed the culture of public
administrations. This article shows how PRP can change the traditional ethos of
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public administrations’ services based on the Weberian model of bureaucracy,
replacing the latter with a new one.
Subjects: Public Administration & Management; Public Management; Human Resource
Management
Keywords: performance-related pay; public administration; incentives; evaluation;
organizational change
1. The evolution of public administrations and pay systems
As many scholars claim, New Public Management (NPM)—which finds its theoretical roots in
institutional economics (Drew & Dollery, 2015; Luke, Kearins, & Verreynne, 2017)—has strongly
affected reforms in public administrations since the end of the last century (Diefenbach, 2009;
Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 2003, 2009). NPM has two main theoretical stances. The first consists of
a set of administrative reform doctrines based on the ideas of ‘professional management’
expertise as portable, paramount over technical expertise, requiring high discretionary
power to achieve results (‘free to manage’) and central and indispensable to better organi-
zational performance, through the development of appropriate cultures and the active
measurement and adjustment of organizational outputs. (Hood, 1991)
The second is rooted in business and its connection to “contestability, user choice, transparency
and close concentration on incentive structures” (Hood, 1991). Despite there being no univocal
conceptualization of NPM (Dunleavy, Margetts, Tinkler, & Bastow, 2006), it can be said to propound
a business approach to managing public administrations. In other words, it aims to make public
administrations and their employees “much more ‘business-like’ and ‘market-oriented’, that is,
performance-, cost-, efficiency- and audit-oriented” (Diefenbach, 2009). Performance is thus intro-
duced into public administrations alongside planning and control systems, which implies a strong
connection between work done, objectives reached, and remuneration.
PRP systems are one of the applications of the NPM theory in public administrations. PRP implies
that the work of public employees must be evaluated and praise or penalty must be dealt out
(Marsden & Richardson, 1994). Consequently, “salaries also become less uniform and less pre-
dictable” (Pollitt, 2009) through the introduction of financial incentives to improve performance in
public administrations.
PRP is a watershed in the evolution of public administrations, as it radically transforms employ-
ment contracts, moving from implicit to explicit remuneration; for example, from remuneration
based on seniority and one’s role in the public administration to remuneration based on oppor-
tunely verified objectives reached (Marsden, 1993). This is key to understanding the evolution of
public administrations because it signifies a radical change in the “psychological contract”
between public employee and public employer. The psychological contract is defined as “an
individual’s beliefs about the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between
that person and another party” (Rousseau, 1998). Argyris (1960), Levinson, Price, Munden, Mandl,
and Solley (1962), and Schein (1980) originally defined the psychological contract to characterize
the subjective nature of an employment relationship. This shift marks a dramatic change in the
role of public employees and in the core principle of public administrations that goes from being
one of the efficacy (adopting policies) to one of the effectiveness (offering services). PRP is thus the
key needed to shift from implicit to explicit remuneration.
PRP systems have been widely adopted by public administrations in the past 30 years (Roberts,
2010). In 2008, 80% of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries had already adopted PRP systems in public administrations (Lah & Perry, 2008). However,
both NPM principles related to measuring and evaluating performance and the use of PRP have
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been subject to criticism, especially since 2000. Cardona (2006) claims: “There is no conclusive
empirical evidence that such an approach has effectively helped to improve motivation and
performance within public service.” Consequently, if PRP aims to promote the motivation of public
employees, perhaps “the single most important issue is not so much the amount of money
involved but the way it is allocated via the appraisal system” (Marsden & Richardson, 1994).
The literature has shown that emphasis on results and incentives can lead to investing less time
and money in the precise assessment of employee skills, or their level of expertise (Hood, 1991). In
this way, the risk of setting inappropriate goals (Gailmard & Patty, 2007) and overlooking individual
professional development becomes more likely and consequently affects motivation.
Several scholars now agree that “PRP systems have generally been unsuccessful” (Perry, Mesch,
& Paarlberg, 2006) and identify the causes as both the practical difficulties of implementing
evaluation systems in public administrations and the technical aspects of such implementation
(OECD, 2005; Rexed, Moll, Manning, & Allainet, 2007). PRP systems can have side effects such as
low productivity, decreased motivation, unnecessary work activities, and higher control costs. It is
generally accepted that these effects are more easily found in the public rather than the private
sector (Inauen, Rost, Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2010), precisely because of the former’s peculia-
rities in terms of personnel and budget management.
Despite the criticism in the literature, PRP is still widely adopted (Hyndman & Ende, 2001)
because of a general acceptance of the NPM-based logic claiming that more accountability equals
better performance (Bellé, 2010; Dubmick, 2005).
In the past 25 years, the management literature on PRP in public administrations has mainly
focused on the reasons behind the introduction of PRP and on the consistency of its application.
Specifically, scholars have tried to establish whether it has been an effective tool for the imple-
mentation of new management strategies in the public sector, what kind of influence it has had on
the motivation of public employees, how much it has contributed to making remuneration more
equitable and flexible, and how it has led to organizational changes in public administrations. Less
attention has been paid to whether the introduction of PRP has caused changes in the deep
organizational culture of the public administration.
The present article positions itself within this gap in research and aims to establish whether the
shift from implicit to explicit remuneration systems in public administrations through PRP systems
has been accepted and implemented by public employees. The public ethos could be compromised
if there is an inconsistency between the objective of the remuneration system and the daily
operational leverages, in as much as people do not know the meaning of their work.
Following this reasoning, this paper aims to answer whether or not the Italian public adminis-
trations’ employees (working in ministries, schools, authorities, or local governments) have
accepted explicit remuneration. In Italy, PRP has constituted the key aspect of public sector
reforms—much more than in other countries—since 1992 (Ongaro & Valotti, 2008; Ruffini, 2000;
Spano & Monfardini, 2018).
The article is structured as follows: First, PRP and its challenges are analyzed based on the notion
of incentive; second, the evolution of PRP implementation in the past 30 years in Italy is presented.
The case analyzes systematic PRP implementation as well as the several practical issues con-
nected to it and allows for an overview of the changes and contradictions triggered in Italian
public administrations.
2. Incentives in public administrations
The shift from implicit to explicit remuneration systems is key to the process of change and reform
in public management. The change in remuneration is no mere management strategy but affects
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an organization deeply, as it influences the principle of equality in employment relationships and
the psychological contract between employer and employee. Incongruence between remuneration
(i.e., how much is paid) and the features and culture of the organization (i.e., why a specific
amount is paid) can cause opportunism and moral disengagement in employees who can no
longer gauge the level of equality of the bonuses they receive.
An implicit remuneration system implies that the employee is paid in order to represent the
institution, to pursue its goals, and to be loyal to it. Technically, this is recognized through different
pay levels unconnected to productivity but connected to role and seniority. This is the model
traditionally adopted by public administrations due to structural reasons, such as difficulties in
monitoring performance, the need to protect institutional roles, and the bargaining power of public
employees. An explicit remuneration system implies that employees are paid based on the services
provided in relation to their roles and objectives, which are in turn usually connected to an
organization’s production goals.
Despite the diversity of the public and private sectors based on different institutional aims and
the different structure of property rights (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), public and private employ-
ment have become progressively more homogenous to achieve the improvement of efficiency
levels in public administrations. This was necessary because of the quantitative and qualitative
growth of public services, the financial crisis, and the ideologies that developed in the 1980s,
especially that of NPM.
The key element in developing explicit remuneration is the notion of incentive, which must be
the focus here. Incentives are offers that define a benefit or an extrinsic bonus, which is neither the
natural consequence of an action nor a deserved reward but rather depends on fulfilling an
intentionally designed request to alter the status quo, whereby an individual is led to make choices
he or she would not make were the incentive not there (Grant, 2012). In other words, incentives
are ways of modifying individual preference, leading to behavior that would not happen otherwise.
Incentives are a key concept in economics, especially in agency or principal-agent theory
(Arellano-Gault, 2000; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kaboolian, 1998). The notion is based on the
model of self-interested homo oeconomicus, which implies rational, selfish, and extrinsically
motivated individuals. “As a consequence, human behaviour can be directed through the selective
deployment of rewards or sanctions. Individuals will perform best when the incentive system links
rewards as closely as possible to performance” (Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010). In practice, “cash
compensation should be structured to provide big rewards for outstanding performance and
meaningful penalties for poor performance” (Jensen & Murphy, 2010). This theory has proven
valid in the private business sector (Lazear, 2000).
However, the same research has highlighted peculiarities in the public sector; for instance, the
importance of prosocial motivation. The public sector thus provides evidence not only of the issue
of self-interest but also that of public service motivation. Furthermore, the role of the manager and
the independence of the professionals become ambiguous (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Bryer &
Cooper, 2007; Burgess & Ratto, 2003; Doolin, 2002).
A system of incentives causes further issues in public administrations due to the importance of
intrinsic motivation to public employees (Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013). Intrinsic motivation is
typical, necessary, and frequent in public administrations (Cacioppe & Mock, 1984; Crewson, 1997;
Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013), so much so that the gap between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation is often wide (Buelens & Van den Broeck, 2007; Houston, 2000; Perry, 1997).
Behavioral economics provide a wider array of sources for motivation and take into considera-
tion intrinsic motivation based on the gratification derived from taking part in a project with no
external incentives. In fact, the ideal intrinsic incentive lies in the work itself, which should be
Ruffini et al., Cogent Business & Management (2020), 7: 1724703
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2020.1724703
Page 4 of 15
gratifying to employees (Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013). This can be employment- or obligation-
based. In the former case, intrinsic motivation is based on personal gratification gained from
carrying out a specific task. Obligation-based intrinsic motivation refers to an activity where the
objective is an appropriate action. When individuals are led by intrinsic motivation, following the
rules is in their interest (Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013; Ryan & Deci, 2000), regardless of
external incentives like extra remuneration. In particular, individuals are concerned with the well-
being of the other parties involved, as it is in their interest to safeguard the community.
Under certain conditions, external incentives can inhibit intrinsic motivation and cause
a crowding-out effect (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Frey, 1997; Frey & Osterloh,
2002; Lidenberg, 2001; Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2007). It is precisely the “performance of intrinsi-
cally motivated tasks that is harmed by pay for performance” (Weibel et al., 2010). The effect is
also conventionally called the corruption effect of extrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975; Deci & Flaste,
1995; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1998).
The crowding-out effect happens when the following conditions are met: (1) The individual is
intrinsically motivated before the crowding-out effect occurs; (2) The individual sees the reward as
a means to control rather than support autonomous behavior; (3) The price effect (i.e., the reward)
does not compensate for the decrease of intrinsic motivation. It is important to note that
employee satisfaction depends on the principles of equality. Satisfaction comes from “the per-
ceived relationship between what one expects of one’s job and what one perceives as being
offered by the employer” (Locke, 1969).
While the effects of incentives on public employee motivation have been widely researched, less
attention seems to have been paid to the moral consequences of incentives on the behavior of
public employees. It is necessary to emphasize how incentives affect both intrinsic motivation and
moral behavior in individuals. An example of this is the bad news effect (Bowless, 2016), which
occurs when incentives are designed in the employer’s interest rather than the employee’s; for
instance, lower remuneration in the case of repeated absence from work, or days off before or
after holidays or weekends. The implied penalty in such incentives negatively affects the trust
between the employer and employee, and if these incentives are to be effective, the employer
must find ways of reassuring the employees. Research has shown that intrinsically motivated
individuals will react negatively rather than try to maximize their productivity.
A second example is moral disengagement (Bandura, 1991; Bowless, 2016), which happens
when individuals are given incentives and behavior instructions in order to reach objectives. This
proves to “switch off” their ethics (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011), as the incentive-driven routine
virtually obliterates their sense of guilt and moral code. This happens so cognitive dissonance can
be avoided (Mero, Guidice, & Brownlee, 2007). Evidence shows a crowding-out effect here, too,
especially in highly moral individuals who perceive incentives as an obligation or a constriction,
which can affect them in terms of their social or religious convictions.
Lastly, employees feel less independent (Bowless, 2016; Grant, 2012) because a third party sets
a specific goal for them and monitors the actions taken to achieve it. This is a further cause of the
crowding-out effect undermining the employees’ sense of independence, affecting their proactivity,
and leading them to make safe choices for which they feel little accountability (i.e., cherry-picking).
Therefore, in PRP systems, the issues of the amount of extra money an employee receives and the
equal distribution of money in the workplace combine with the issues of which performances corre-
spond to incentives and how the former affects the employees’ value systems and the relationships in
the workplace. In this sense, incentives can have a significant impact on individual value systems.
The literature shows the structural features and peculiarities of the public sector make designing
incentives more complex than in the private sector. The main difficulties are the highly volatile
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economic and political contexts in which public administrations operate, as well as the possibility
of managing public services in terms of objectives. Measuring performance is so complex as to
require a constant renegotiation of the initial goals (Barbato, Salvadori, & Turri, 2018; Barbato &
Turri, 2017; Rebora, Ruffini, & Turri, 2017). The so-called multitasking problem (Holmstrom &
Milgrom, 1991) presents additional difficulties, as objectives appear to be structurally ambiguous.
Financial incentives cause employees to “reduce their effort on tasks that produce unobservable
outputs as they seek the salient reward to observable effort” (Al-Ubaydli & Lee, 2012).
Furthermore, in the public administration, the ability to pay is generally limited (compared to the
private sector) and is usually low because fixed remuneration cannot be altered to favor variable
remuneration (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough&Haoran, 1993; Moon, 2000). Combinedwith intrinsicmotiva-
tion dynamics, this negatively affects motivation, especially regarding important and interesting tasks.
Another difficulty in adopting merit pay systems in the public administration is measuring results
(Micheli & Mari, 2014). PRP requires exact measurement tools that promote the individual effort.
Such measurements are particularly complex and multidimensional in the public administration.
Extrinsically motivated individuals tend to focus on objectives that are easy to measure and reach
or on elements that are not key to the evaluation of performance (Van Bockel & Noordegraaf,
2006). In other words,
if there is no way to measure what outputs are produced by the administrative action or if
their identification is controversial, the key assumption on which the assessment of perfor-
mance is based is lost, which inevitably paves the way to dysfunctions such as the mea-
surement of partial or unrepresentative outputs. (Barbato et al., 2018)
This could also have a negative impact on motivation, as performance assessments and pay for
performance are two of the most powerful motivational tools of any organization, according to
Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks (2005). These tools are so powerful, managers must face the challenge
of making sure their remuneration systems are not causing improper behavior. A particular vision
is provided in the study by Speklé and Verbeeten (2014), who claim the way in which the
performance measurement systems are used can affect organizational performance differently.
The authors demonstrated how performance measurement systems improve performance
through an incentive system when the level of contractibility of the organization (clear and
measurable goals and knowledge of the transformation processes) is high.
The literature shows that incentives are a powerful yet difficult weapon to use in the public
sector due to its structural characteristics. The effectiveness of incentives is neither expected nor
guaranteed because of their potential side effects at a motivational and cultural level. Badly
managed incentive systems can cause confusion regarding the psychological contract between
employer and employee. In particular, employees can perceive ambiguity between remuneration
for performing the requested task and their mission as public servants.
3. PRP in Italian public administrations
PRP has been applied in public administrations worldwide since the 1990s. In Italy, unions pushed
for performance assessments connected to merit pay. This was introduced after the collective
labor agreements regarding local administrations and health services in 1983.
Incentive systems were based on the logic of key performance indicators and management by
objectives. Since then, the introduction of merit pay has become the cornerstone of governmental
policies for the improvement of public administrations (ministries, regions, schools, local govern-
ments, and healthcare) through a similar legislation. Both political leadership and public opinion
have supported these policies. To summarize, at the beginning of the 1990s, a series of external
factors (Maastricht euro convergence criteria and a nationwide judicial investigation into political
corruption in Italy, dubbed “Tangentopoli”) and scholarly and union debate brought about
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a radical reform of public employment (Legislative Decree no. 29/1993), which virtually aligned
public and private businesses (Capano, 2003).
The reform marked the shift from implicit to explicit remuneration by introducing a legal and
contractual obligation to guarantee results (failing to do so could be the cause for dismissal). This
caused a change in remuneration, which became based on job evaluations and performance
assessments (Ruffini, 2000). Based on the reform, employment contracts introduced and extended
(individual or collective) objective-related financial incentives and introduced individual assess-
ment systems connected to variable remuneration.
In practice, such remuneration tools were misused at first and, in most cases, variable remu-
neration was dealt out indifferently. The reasons for this are complex and diverse, but they can be
ascribed to the structural peculiarities of the incentive applications in public administrations
previously analyzed.
Based on these early experiences, new laws and norms were introduced in collective labor agree-
ments to differentiate performance assessments and variable remuneration. For example, ad hoc
evaluation committees were created to guarantee the reliability of the managers’ performance
assessments, carry out individual performance reviews, avoid undifferentiated distribution of financial
resources, implement distribution of resources based on highly selective criteria, introduce audits by
governmental bodies, and introduce audits (and potential sanctions) by the Italian Court of Auditors,
especially for HR managers. Despite this effort and some doubtless improvements, both the govern-
ment and public opinion remain dissatisfied with PRP implementation in the public sector (Mussari &
Ruggiero, 2010; Rebora et al., 2017).
In 2009, new reforms were introduced (Legislative Decree no. 150/09) to overcome operational
difficulties in HR and, in particular, merit pay systems. To reach this goal, two actions were taken:
first, limiting collective bargaining to empower managers; second, systematically introducing the
logic of performance management as opposed to the previous emphasis on the final steps of the
process, that is, evaluation and remuneration. The law imposed obligations and explicit sanctions.
Furthermore, a national body was created (the National Committee for the Evaluation, Integrity,
and Transparency of Public Administration) to guarantee the success of performance management
systems by instructing local administrations and monitoring operations.
After a difficult start, public administrations fully implemented the new law and introduced
structured performance management systems. At the same time, the global financial crisis pushed
the Italian Government to freeze public salaries by freezing collective labor agreements. This has
strongly inhibited the adoption of variable remuneration systems, though the implementation of
these systems would have been easier had there been more financial resources available (Rebora
et al., 2017). Collective bargaining resumed in 2016, and the government introduced further norms
regarding variable remuneration, specifically collective incentives.
After many years of PRP implementation, the success of performance management systems and
the equality of variable remuneration are still being questioned. However, employee behavior has
started to change (Spano & Monfardini, 2018).
4. Methodology
Considering the policies regarding public employment in the past decades begs the question of
whether the implementation of PRP is coherent with public employees’ expectations. Due to the
complexity of such a question, this article aims to identify possible trends and issues to pave the
way for further research. This work explores the switch to an explicit remuneration system through
the implementation of incentives and focuses on the effects, positive or negative, this has had on
the ethos of public administrations.
Ruffini et al., Cogent Business & Management (2020), 7: 1724703
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2020.1724703
Page 7 of 15
To this end, the differences in the implementation of incentives between the public and the
private sector have been understood as “sentinel events”; that is, events that allow for
qualified answers to the research questions at hand. These have consequently been high-
lighted, and a comparison between the public and the private sector has been made.
In practice, a survey was carried out (Wolf, Joye, Smith, & Fu, 2016) through a multiple-choice
questionnaire consisting of 1 to 5 scale questions (1 representing total disagreement; 5 represent-
ing full agreement). The questionnaire was answered by public and private employees in a specific
area of Southern Italy; in particular, 18 local administrations and 11 businesses. The different fields
of activity of public administrations and private businesses, the technical and contractual variables
in the adoption of incentive systems, and the differences in managerial competencies have not
been deemed relevant to the present analysis, which intends to provide a working evaluation of
the acceptance of incentive systems and explicit retribution. Both the public administrations and
private businesses selected count a different number of employees but have adopted a PRP system
for more than 5 years.
The differences between the public and the private sector are thus the main focus.
Organizational differences (i.e., size, management skills, field of activity) can help to ascertain
whether homogeneity in accepting explicit remuneration has been achieved and what con-
sequences it entails. The questionnaire contained seven statements, six of which were aimed
at ascertaining the level of satisfaction with remuneration. The purpose of the last statement
was to establish whether financial remuneration is deemed more desirable than non-financial
recognition.
The results were processed in purely descriptive terms. The number of respondents was 747,
including 481 public employees from different types of public bodies (the percentage of respon-
dents was 45.23%) and 266 private employees (the percentage of respondents was 39.48%). The
number of women respondents in the public sector was 342 (71%), and there were 80 (30%) in the
private sector. The percentage is consistent with the average number of men and women in the
organizations involved in the survey.
5. Findings
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the results of the survey. To make these clearer, answers 1 and 2 (I
totally disagree and I partially disagree) and answers 4 and 5 (I mostly agree and I completely
agree) have been presented together. The analysis of the results shows a strong polarization in the
public rather than the private sector.
The first statement concerns fair compensation (low effort-reward imbalance). Almost all public
employees (94.59%) completely disagreed with the statement stating they perceived a high effort-
reward imbalance in their place of work. In the private sector, only 35.7% of respondents com-
pletely disagreed with the statement.
Responses to the second statement (equitable distribution of financial incentives) are consistent
with the first. Of the public employees surveyed, 92.72% disagreed with the statement. In the
private sector, only 42.48% of the respondents expressed discontent with the distribution of
incentives.
The considerable difference in the responses between the public and private sectors is likely
ascribable to the differences in how incentives are managed (positive-incentive value, assess-
ment procedures, clear objectives, etc.) but can further be explained in connection with the
practical implementation of remuneration systems in the workplace, that is, in connection with
the organizational conditions in which respondents work.
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Statements 3, 4 and 5 focus on organizational elements:
(1) Career paths are clearly defined in my organization.
(2) Career advancement based on merit is possible in my organization.
(3) I am happy with my career path.
Responses in the public sector tend to be negative here, too, while in the private sector they are
more evenly distributed. In fact, only 36.84% of respondents in the private sector had a negative
view of their professional path, and 44% had a positive view. In the public administration, 88.7% of
the respondents had a negative view, and only 5.61% of the respondents were satisfied with their
professional path.
To summarize, the public administration shows a widespread conviction that merit pay systems
tend to be unfair and professional paths are unclear and unequal. Such dissatisfaction with PRP
might lead to the conclusion that the respondents prefer non-financial recognition.
In fact, this is not the case. When asked whether they are more motivated by performance-
related remuneration systems, most public employees (67.57%) affirm they are. The percentage is
similar in the private sector. The practical implementation of incentive systems in the public
administration is cause for dissatisfaction, which explains the responses to the statement regard-
ing motivation connected with non-financial recognition: only 17.26% of public employees agreed
with the adoption of such forms of incentives—while 62.37% completely disagreed—compared to
47.37% of private employees who completely agreed and only 36.09% who disagreed.
Some survey results provide insight into the impact of merit pay in the public administration.
Two elements are particularly relevant. The first is the remarkable difference in the responses
between the private and public sectors. The second is the apparent contradiction between intense
dissatisfaction with the implementation of merit pay and the conviction that incentives are
a considerable source of motivation.
These two elements are worth considering further.
Table 1. Results of the survey













I experience low effort-reward
imbalance in my work (S1)
94,59 35,71 1,46 13,53 3,95 50,75
Financial incentives are
equitably distributed based on
the quantity and quality of the
work done (S2)
92,72 42,48 3,12 21,43 4,16 36,09
Career paths are clearly
defined in my organisation (S3)
88,77 36,84 5,61 18,8 5,61 44,36
Career advancement based on
merit is possible in my
organisation (S4)
87,53 37,59 6,03 21,05 6,44 41,35
I am happy with my career
path (S5)
80,25 35,71 10,4 15,79 9,36 48,5
Performance-related financial
incentives motivate me (S6)
11,23 19,92 21,21 16,54 67,57 63,53
Non-financial recognition
motivates me (S7)
62,37 36,09 20,37 16,54 17,26 47,37
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Figure 1. Results of the survey.
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6. Discussion and conclusion
Despite the results of exploratory research, the data collected show a level of dissatisfaction with
employment and management in the public administration (ministries, schools, authorities, and
local governments), as opposed to the private sector.
The homogeneity of the responses indicates that negative opinions regarding PRP are shared
across public administrations, not just some departments. The shift from implicit to explicit
remuneration has changed the mentality of public servants, who fully embrace the notion of
having to guarantee results and receiving incentives because of this. In this respect, public and
private employees have a similar mindset. However, public administrations have been unable to
respond to such change by implementing PRP effectively, to the point where public employees
perceive incentives as inequitable and unclear.
Such a negative perception of performance assessments is an obvious indictment of PRP imple-
mentation in the public sector and goes hand in hand with low motivation levels and a difficult
relationship with public administrations. PRP thus appears ineffective in terms of its self-appointed
objectives. However, explicit remuneration is generally accepted, as the survey results indicate.
Increased awareness of merit pay and dissatisfaction with its management (PRP and career
management) suggests the reason for the crowding out of public employees’ intrinsic motivation
in Italy related to PRP policies. This is clear example of the studies on the crowding-out effects
conducted by several authors (Frey, Homberg, & Osterloh, 2013; Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Following more than 30 years of reforms, the consistent adoption of PRP tools has made it
possible for the theories of NPM to be held as behavioral standards by public employees.
However, the dysfunctional nature of such systems—as much for their improper adoption as for
the specific characteristics of public administrations—has generated a conflict between the tradi-
tional and the economic view of public administrations. Such unresolved conflict runs the risk of
doing away with the traditional ethos and values of public service (protection of citizen rights, etc.)
without replacing them with more adequate and more current values. As Derrek Lewis, the former
Director General of HM Prison Service, said in 1995, the ethos of public service is at risk because
many public employees feel they are not as valued as they should be. The second conflict is of
a moral kind: an individual might feel conflicted, thereby accepting behavior otherwise unaccep-
table. Examples of such behavior are as follows: privileging the principle of efficiency over protect-
ing rights and offering good services; other cherry-picking strategies, such as carrying out control
and bureaucratic practices without worrying about the timing of service delivery, or maintaining
the status quo without pursuing innovation.
Moreover, the contradiction between dissatisfaction with PRP and the claim that PRP is more
motivating than non-financial recognition shows that a crowdingout of intrinsic motivation has
occurred. This implies the risk of moral disengagement and the creation of individuals trying to
maximize their utility. As highlighted in several studies, the moral disengagement phenomenon
causes employees’ ethics to “switch off” (Shu et al., 2011).
The consequences of PRP involve not only the fundamental problem of unethical behavior (Bellé
& Cantarelli, 2017) but also the legitimization of this unethical behavior given by an ambiguous
approach of explicit remuneration. This could both affect the public ethos and have a strong
negative impact on the relationships within public administrations, undermining the main ele-
ments of collaboration in the workplace (trust, reciprocity, sharing a mission, etc.).
This study suggests the use of financial incentives in public administrations is a powerful tool,
but this is precisely why it must be implemented very carefully.
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These phenomena have been highlighted by many authors, such as Pollitt in 2003 and
Diefenbach in 2009 or, in relation to the Italian case, Capano in 2003 and Rebora et al. in 2017.
These facts are particularly marked in the presence of incentives and reward mechanisms (Speklé
& Verbeeten, 2014; Van Bockel & Noordegraaf, 2006).
Our results can be considered part of the debate on the dysfunctional mechanisms of both
private and public sectors. Many scholars already highlighted these mechanisms (e.g., Diefenbach,
2009; Pollitt, 2003), even in relation to the Italian case (Capano, 2003; Rebora et al., 2017). These
dysfunctions occur especially in the presence of incentive and award systems (Speklé & Verbeeten,
2014; Van Bockel & Noordegraaf, 2006).
By positioning our study within this debate, we highlight how PRP logic and the consistent
application of NPM have modified the perception of public service, and public servants are now
expected to be compensated based on results.
The ineffective management of incentives in public administrations affects the intrinsic motiva-
tion of public employees and runs the risk of engendering moral disengagement. The idea of
implementing merit pay and performance assessment procedures in the public administration has
made public employees more like private employees, but the shift is incomplete.
PRP should thus be used more carefully, and incentives should not be the only strategy adopted
for the development of public employees and organizations.
It is possible to identify some limits in this study. The main limit is the exploratory nature of the
study, which does not present significant results. In fact, the analysis aimed to shed light—through
our survey—on the incongruences of the Italian explicit remuneration systems. Another limit of
the study comes from examining only the critical literature without considering other types of
analyses, which, for example, stress the necessity of the incentive systems.
The data presented here require further analysis and further rigorous qualitative and quantita-
tive research. More attention should be devoted to public management, especially in the light of
progress in management skills and new technologies. In conclusion, public management requires
studies and operational criteria that are consistent with its inner workings rather than attempts at
adapting it to unsuitable managerial models.
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